Representationalism and the scene-immediacy of visual experience: A journey to the fringe and back

Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):595-615 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Both visual experience and conscious thought represent external objects, but in visual experience these objects seem present before the mind and available for direct access in a way that they don’t in conscious thought. In this paper, I introduce a couple of challenges that this “Scene-Immediacy” of visual experience raises for traditional versions of Representationalism. I then identify a resource to which Representationalists can appeal in addressing these challenges: the low-detail fringe of visual experience. I argue that low-detail contents within visual experience provide the mind with a rich access to additional high-detail information, an access that is not found in conscious thought. This access, in turn, speaks to the challenges raised by the Scene-Immediacy of visual experience. Robert Schroer is an Assistant Professor at the University of Minnesota at Duluth.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-03-31

Downloads
741 (#21,954)

6 months
127 (#30,992)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Schroer
University of Minnesota, Duluth

Citations of this work

Consciousness and the limits of memory.Joseph Gottlieb - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5217-5243.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.

View all 32 references / Add more references