Propositions, What Are They Good For?

In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning (Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy, Vol. 3). Walter de Gruyter (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Although there is a vast literature on whether propositional attitudes are relations to propositions, a crucial question that ought to lie at the heart of this debate is not often enough seriously addressed. This is the question of the contribution propositions make to the ways in which we benefit from having our propositional-attitude concepts, if those concepts are concepts of relations to propositions. Unless propositions can be shown to confer a benefit that no non-propositions could provide, we should probably doubt whether propositional attitudes really are relations to propositions. I believe that propositional attitudes are relations to propositions and that the role played by them in our conceptual economy cannot be played by things of any other kind, and in this paper I try to say why. This paper, in other words, offers my answer to the question posed by my title.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
222 (#83,215)

6 months
6 (#202,901)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stephen Schiffer
New York University

Citations of this work

The metaphysics of propositional constituency.Lorraine Keller - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):655-678.
A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin & James Franklin - 2022 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 29 (1):47-77.
The Long Shadow of Semantic Platonism.Gustavo Picazo - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2211-2242.
The Explanatory Role of Propositions.Peter Hanks - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):370-379.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references