European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-18 (2021)

In this paper, I demonstrate that Kant's commitment to an asymmetry between the control conditions for praise and blame is explained by his endorsement of the principle Ought Implies Can (OIC). I argue that Kant accepts only a relatively weak version of OIC and that he is hence committed only to a relatively weak requirement of alternate possibilities for moral blame. This suggests that whether we are transcendentally free is irrelevant to questions about moral permissibility and moral blameworthiness.
Keywords Kant  Kantian ethics  Ought Implies Can  Free will  Moral responsibility
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Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1111/ejop.12548
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An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.

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