Abstract
In this critical notice, I argue that Emanuel Rutten's reading of Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds rests on an extremely phenomenalist reading of Kant's idealism. Rutten makes the ontological claim that Kant's phenomena are reducible to our sensations, and do not exist as objects outside our representations. As a result, his criticism of Kant's restriction thesis that we only know appearances is uncharitably narrow; Rutten argues that, according to Kant, our ignorance of the supersensible applies, not just to objects that we cannot sensibly represent, but in fact to *all* objects outside our representations, including spatially located objects of nature. His sense of *supersensible* is at least ambiguous. I further argue that Rutten's own notion of "a world for us" (in contrast to "a world in itself") consisting of knowable objects is compatible with Kant's phenomenal world, contrary to what Rutten believes.