Neuroscience findings are consistent with appraisal theories of emotion; but does the brain “respect” constructionism?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):163-164 (2012)
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Abstract

I reject Lindquist et al.'s implicit claim that all emotion theories other than constructionist ones subscribe to a approach. The neural mechanisms underlying relevance detection, reward, attention, conceptualization, or language use are consistent with many theories of emotion, in particular componential appraisal theories. I also question the authors' claim that the meta-analysis they report provides support for the specific assumptions of constructionist theories

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