Nonreductive Ethical Naturalism

The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 1:3-6 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper argues that Nonreductive ethical naturalism is a viable approach to normative ethical theory. Central to Nonreductive ethical naturalism is the identification of moral properties with natural ones. Natural properties are objective and pertain to facts. It follows that moral properties are factual in nature. In the proposed theory pain and harm are the natural properties that are also moral in nature. Pain and harm are not identical. Pain is the chief indicator of harm. The concept of harm entails injury. Injury to an individual is both a factual and moral issue. The well-being of individuals constitutes the foundation of morality. Consequently, that which runs counter to an individual's well-being is what we mean by evil. It follows that injury is evil and its intentional infliction upon other people is morally evil. The factual nature of ethical properties provides the basis for universal agreement on which forms of behavior are evil. As such, acceptance of this theory would go a long way in resolving many of the global problems that confront us all at the onset of the 2 1 s t century.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral discourse and descriptive properties.Brad Majors - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):475–494.
Moral dependence.Nick Zangwill - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-27.
Why naturalism?David Copp - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):179-200.
Externalism, Motivation, and Moral Knowledge.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2011 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.
Two kinds of naturalism in ethics.Neil Sinclair - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (4):417 - 439.
A defence of mencius' ethical naturalism.James A. Ryan - 1997 - Asian Philosophy 7 (1):23 – 36.
Nonreductive naturalism.Stuart Silvers - 1997 - Theoria 12 (28):163-84.
Intuitive non-naturalism meets cosmic coincidence.Matthew S. Bedke - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-12-02

Downloads
95 (#182,120)

6 months
10 (#274,061)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references