Matching Sensible Qualities: A Skeleton in the Closet for Representationalism

Philosophical Studies 107 (3):259-273 (2002)
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Abstract

The intransitivity of matching sensible qualities of color isa threat not only to the sense-data theory, but to allrealist theories of sensible qualities, including thecurrent leading realist theory: representationalism.I save representationalism from this threat by way ofa novel yet empirically plausible hypothesis about theintrospective classification of sensible qualities of color.I argue that due to limitations of the visual system's abilityto extract fine-grained information about color fromthe environment, introspective classification of sensiblequalities of color is sensitive to features of context.I finish by arguing for the superiority of mysolution over two alternative solutions: one by NelsonGoodman, the other by C.L. Hardin.

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Citations of this work

Phenomenal and objective size.John Zeimbekis - 2009 - Noûs 43 (2):346-362.
Tolerance effect in categorisation with vague predicates.Minyao Huang - 2013 - Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (2):340-358.
Tolerance effect in categorisation with vague predicates.Minyao Huang - 2013 - Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (2):340-358.

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References found in this work

A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.
On What There Is.W. V. O. Quine - 1948 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 221-233.
The Structure of Appearance.Nelson Goodman - 1956 - Studia Logica 4:255-261.
On the coherence of vague predicates.Crispin Wright - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):325--65.

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