Model organisms and behavioral genetics: A rejoinder

Philosophy of Science 65 (2):276-288 (1998)
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Abstract

In this rejoinder to the three preceding comments, I provide some additional philosophical warrant for the biomedical sciences' focus on model organisms. I then relate the inquiries on model systems to the concept of 'deep homology', and indicate that the issues that appear to divide my commentators and myself are in part empirical ones. I cite recent work on model organisms, and especially C. elegans that supports my views. Finally, I briefly readdress some of the issues raised by Developmental Systems Theory

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Kenneth Schaffner
University of Pittsburgh

References found in this work

Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine.Kenneth F. Schaffner - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):621-623.
What is the developmentalist challenge?Paul E. Griffiths & Robin D. Knight - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (2):253-258.
Theory structure in the biomedical sciences.Kenneth F. Schaffner - 1980 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 5 (1):57-97.
Simple systems and phylogenetic diversity.William C. Wimsatt - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (2):267-275.

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