Abstract

Amongst philosophers, perhaps Heidegger displayed the greatest resistance to defining thought; for him, thinking can only be appreciated by diverting our attention from any extant characteristics and instead undertaking its practice directly. This practical limitation requires that we relinquish any claims of self-possession, certitude, and reflexivity in the Cartesian sense, paradoxically ascribing to thought only the gesture that defers in favor of that matter or concern granting its own occasion. Thinking arises in this movement of transposition as a response to the otherness spawning it, for example, in provoking a question. Heidegger describes this radical inducement to thought as a “leap.” But unless we become immersed in a mystery prematurely, it is important to recognize that the distance such a leap traverses can arise only due to a relationship which remains tantalizingly close, namely, thought’s dependence on language.