Intuitionism versus Degrees of Truth

Analysis 50 (1):43 - 47 (1990)
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Abstract

Putnam's intuitionist proposal for a logic of vague terms is defended. It is argued that both classical logic and the degrees of truth approach are committed to treating vague terms as having hidden precise borderlines. This is a crucial failing in a logic of vagueness. Intuitionism, because of the nature of intuitionist negation, avoids this failing

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Citations of this work

Measuring and Modelling Truth.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):345-356.
Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2011 - In Petr Cintula, Chris Fermüller, Lluis Godo & Petr Hájek (eds.), Logical Models of Reasoning with Vague Information. pp. 1--19.

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