Diametros 43:137-157 (2015)

Abstract
The paper discusses the view of William James on the contribution of will to our decisions to act. According to James, our voluntary action, which for him is strongly connected with an intention to do something, occurs when the subject of the action knows its sensorimotor effects. An attempt has been made to defend James’ view and rebut popular criticisms aiming to undermine the role of knowledge in voluntary action. The paper also offers to identify a contemporary context for the ideomotor theory of action. It is argued that such a context is provided by the enactive theory of perception
Keywords voluntary and involuntary action  Piotr Gutowski  sensorimotor effects  James-Lange theory  teoria Jamesa-Langego  Antonio Damasio  action  wolitywne i niewolitywne działanie  Edmund Rolls  sensomotoryczne efekty  the ideomotor theory of action
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DOI 10.13153/diam.43.2015.721
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[Book Chapter].M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.) - 1997 - Oxford University Press.

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