Getting Real on Rationality—Behavioral Science, Nudging, and Public Policy

Ethics 129 (4):511-543 (2019)
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Abstract

The nudge approach seeks to improve people’s decisions through small changes in their choice environments. Nudge policies often work through psychological mechanisms that deviate from traditional notions of rationality. Because of that, some critics object that nudging treats people as irrational. Such treatment might be disrespectful in itself and might crowd out more empowering policies. I defend nudging against these objections. By defending a nonstandard, ecological model of rationality, I argue that nudging not only is compatible with rational agency but can even support it. Accordingly, a concern with rationality speaks for more rather than less public policy nudging.

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Andreas T. Schmidt
University of Groningen

References found in this work

Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality.Peter Railton - 1984 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2):134-171.
Two kinds of respect.Stephen L. Darwall - 1977 - Ethics 88 (1):36-49.
Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 14 (3):377-382.

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