Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):365-384 (2012)
AbstractBenjamin Libet's empirical challenge to free will has received a great deal of attention and criticism. A standard line of response has emerged that many take to be decisive against Libet's challenge. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that this standard response fails to put the challenge to rest. It fails, in particular, to address a recent follow-up experiment that raises a similar worry about free will (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). In the second part, however, I will argue that we can altogether avoid Libet-style challenges if we adopt a traditional compatibilist account of free will. In the final section, I will briefly explain why there is good and independent reason to think about free will in this way
Similar books and articles
Libet's Experiment Provides No Evidence Against Strong Libertarian Free Will Because It Investigates the Wrong Kind of Action.Daniel von Wachter - manuscript
Neuroscience, Choice, and the Free Will Debate.Jason Shepard & Shane Reuter - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics - Neuroscience 3 (3):7-11.
Libet's Experiment Provides No Evidence Against Strong Libertarian Free Will Because Readiness Potentials Do Not Cause Our Actions.Daniel von Wachter - manuscript
Mental Causation and Free Will After Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency.Alexander Batthyany - 2009 - In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism.Tim Bayne - 2011 - In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
Commentary on Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry.Benjamin W. Libet - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):95-96.
Did I Do It? Yeah, You Did! On Wittgenstein and Libet on Free Will.Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez & René J. Campis - 2008 - In Hannes Leitgeb & Alexander Hieke (eds.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
DID I DO IT? -YEAH, YOU DID!Muñoz-Suárez Carlos M. & Campis René J. - 2008 - Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences:34- 37.
The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2009 - Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
The Neuroscientific Study of Free Will: A Diagnosis of the Controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.
Libet-Style Experiments, Neuroscience, and Libertarian Free Will.Marcelo Fischborn - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):494-502.
Causally Efficacious Intentions and the Sense of Agency: In Defense of Real Mental Causation.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.
References found in this work
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.