Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons

Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper presents a counterexample to the principle that all epistemic reasons for doxastic attitudes towards p are provided by evidence concerning p. I begin by motivating and clarifying the principle and the associated picture of epistemic reasons, including the notion of evidence concerning a proposition, which comprises both first- and second-order evidence. I then introduce the counterexample from incoherent doxastic attitudes by presenting three example cases. In each case, the fact that the subject’s doxastic attitudes are incoherent is an epistemic reason to suspend, which is not provided by evidence. I argue that this incoherence fact is a reason for the subject to take a step back and reassess her evidence for her conflicting attitudes, and thus a reason to suspend all of them. Suspending judgment enables the subject to revise attitudes where appropriate and thus (typically) to arrive at a set of coherent and well-supported attitudes. I then address a dilemma for my proposal and, in conclusion, briefly suggest a picture of epistemic reasons on which they are to be understood against the background of the subject’s virtuous intellectual conduct.

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Author's Profile

Eva Schmidt
TU Dortmund

Citations of this work

Incoherence and the balance of evidential reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-10.
In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.
What kind of reason does incoherence provide?Keshav Singh - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-9.

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Reasons First.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
Meditations on First Philosophy.René Descartes - 1984 [1641] - Ann Arbor: Caravan Books. Edited by Stanley Tweyman.
Sense and Sensibilia.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

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