Finitistic and Frequentistic Approximation of Probability Measures with or without σ-Additivity

Studia Logica 89 (2):257-283 (2008)
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Abstract

In this paper a theory of finitistic and frequentistic approximations — in short: f-approximations — of probability measures P over a countably infinite outcome space N is developed. The family of subsets of N for which f-approximations converge to a frequency limit forms a pre-Dynkin system $${{D\subseteq\wp(N)}}$$. The limiting probability measure over D can always be extended to a probability measure over $${{\wp(N)}}$$, but this measure is not always σ-additive. We conclude that probability measures can be regarded as idealizations of limiting frequencies if and only if σ-additivity is not assumed as a necessary axiom for probabilities. We prove that σ-additive probability measures can be characterized in terms of so-called canonical and in terms of so-called full f-approximations. We also show that every non-σ-additive probability measure is f-approximable, though neither canonically nor fully f-approximable. Finally, we transfer our results to probability measures on open or closed formulas of first-order languages.

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Author Profiles

Gerhard Schurz
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.
The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin T. Kelly - 1996 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by Kevin Kelly.
Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures.Patrick Suppes - 2002 - CSLI Publications (distributed by Chicago University Press).

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