Evolution and Normative Scepticism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):471-488 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism leads inevitably to a general scepticism about our ability to reliably form normative beliefs. In what follows, I argue that this is not the case. In particular, I consider several possible arguments from evolutionary theory and normative realism to normative scepticism and explain where they go wrong. I then offer a more general diagnosis of the tendency to accept such arguments and why this tendency should be resisted

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Against essential normativity of the mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.
How to Be a Normative Expressivist.Michael Pendlebury - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):182-207.
Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.
Crossing the Milvian bridge: When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk belief?Paul E. Griffiths & John S. Wilkins - 2015 - In Phillip R. Sloan, Gerald McKenny & Kathleen Eggleson (eds.), Darwin in the Twenty-First Century: Nature, Humanity, and God. University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 201-231.
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-11

Downloads
244 (#77,418)

6 months
11 (#138,082)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Karl Schafer
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Debunking arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12):e12638.
Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.

View all 42 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Thinking how to live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.

View all 13 references / Add more references