Law and Philosophy 9 (3):269 - 283 (1990)
AbstractTo protect what it deems fundamental rights, the Supreme Court strictly scrutinizes legislation that impinges on these rights. The Court views such legislation as a means to some end the legislation seeks to accomplish. The Court requires that the statute be neither overinclusive nor underinclusive; the legislation may not affect more people than necessary to achieve its end, nor is the statute permitted to leave some people out in achieving its end.I argue that when legislation imposes burdens, its underinclusiveness is irrelevant, and that when it dispenses rewards its overinclusiveness is irrelevant, because those affected by the statute areex hypothesi deserving. One commits thetu quoque fallacy when one tries to infer that those affected by the law are undeserving from the fact that some deserving individuals were not affected by the statute.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Similar books and articles
Mental Health Courts and Title II of the Ada: Accessibility to State Court Systems for Individuals with Mental Disabilities and the Need for Diversion.Sally Elizabeth Wilborn-Malloy - manuscript
The Supreme Court and Judicial Legislation: A Reflection on Constitutional Protections and Democracy.Lisa H. Newton - 1975 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 49:208-217.
A Textual Approach to Harmonizing Sherbert and Smith on Religious Accommodations.Nicholas James Nelson - manuscript
Re Herrington: Aboriginality and the Quality of Human Rights Jurisprudence in End-of-Life Decisions by the Australian Judiciary.Thomas Alured Faunce - unknown
Requiring Consent Vs. Waiving Consent for Medical Records Research: A Minnesota Law Vs. The U.S. (HIPAA) Privacy Rule.Beverly Woodward & Dale Hammerschmidt - 2003 - Health Care Analysis 11 (3):207-218.