Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences

Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219 (2012)
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Abstract

A defense of imprecise credences (and other imprecise doxastic attitudes).

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10.1007/s11098-012-9886-7

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Miriam Schoenfield
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.

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References found in this work

Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235–256.
Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.

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