Bridging Rationality and Accuracy

Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper is about the connection between rationality and accuracy. I show that one natural picture about how rationality and accuracy are connected emerges if we assume that rational agents are rationally omniscient. I then develop an alternative picture that allows us to relax this assumption, in order to accommodate certain views about higher order evidence

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

ISBN(s)

0022362X

DOI

10.5840/jphil20151121242

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.
Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.
Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.
Accuracy and the belief-credence connection.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15:1-20.
Rationality and higher-order intentionality.Alan Millar - 2001 - Philosophy Supplement 49:179-198.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.
Demonstrative induction, old and new evidence and the accuracy of the electrostatic inverse square law.Ronald Laymon - 1994 - Synthese 99 (1):23 - 58.
The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-47.
Accuracy and Evidence.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):579-596.
Instrumental rationality, epistemic rationality, and evidence-gathering.Lara Buchak - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.
Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 229--251.
Sensations, Perceptions and Conceptions. Remarks on Assessability for Accuracy.Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez - 2009 - In V. Munz, J. Wang & K. Puhl (eds.), Language and World. Niederösterreichkultur.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-10-28

Downloads
1,323 (#8,265)

6 months
145 (#20,758)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Miriam Schoenfield
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

What is justified credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.

View all 48 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.
Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.

View all 19 references / Add more references