Bayesian h-d confirmation and structuralistic truthlikeness: Discussion and comparison with the relevant-element and the content-part approach

Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):141-159 (2005)
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Abstract

In this paper it is shown that, in spite of their intuitive starting points, Kuipers' accounts lead to counterintuitive consequences. The counterintuitive results of Kuipers' account of H-D confirmation stem from the fact that Kuipers explicates a concept of partial (as opposed to full) confirmation. It is shown that Schurz-Weingartner's relevant-element approach as well as Gemes' content-part approach provide an account of full confirmation that does not lead to these counterintuitive results. One of the unwelcome results of Kuipers' account of nomic truthlikeness is the consequence that a theory Y, in order to be more truthlike than a theory X (where Y and X are incompatible), must imply the entire nomic truth. It is shown how the relevant-element approach to truthlikeness avoids this result.

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Gerhard Schurz
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

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