A Representation Theorem for Absolute Confirmation

Philosophy of Science 84 (1):82-91 (2017)
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Abstract

Proposals for rigorously explicating the concept of confirmation in probabilistic terms abound. To foster discussions on the formal properties of the proposed measures, recent years have seen the upshot of a number of representation theorems that uniquely determine a confirmation measure based on a number of desiderata. However, the results that have been presented so far focus exclusively on the concept of incremental confirmation. This leaves open the question whether similar results can be obtained for the concept of absolute confirmation. This article closes the gap by providing a representation theorem for absolute confirmation measures.

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Michael Schippers
University of Oldenburg

Citations of this work

Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):371-398.
The Systemic Concept of Contextual Truth.Andrzej Bielecki - 2020 - Foundations of Science 26 (4):807-824.

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References found in this work

Studies in the logic of confirmation.Carl A. Hempel - 1983 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-26.
Measuring confirmation.David Christensen - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461.

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