A Judgmental Reconstruction of some of Professor Woleński’s logical and philosophical writings

Studia Humana 9 (3):72-103 (2020)
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Abstract

Roman Suszko said that “Obviously, any multiplication of logical values is a mad idea and, in fact, Łukasiewicz did not actualize it.” The aim of the present paper is to qualify this ‘obvious’ statement through a number of logical and philosophical writings by Professor Jan Woleński, all focusing on the nature of truth-values and their multiple uses in philosophy. It results in a reconstruction of such an abstract object, doing justice to what Suszko held a ‘mad’ project within a generalized logic of judgments. Four main issues raised by Woleński will be considered to test the insightfulness of such generalized truth-values, namely: the principle of bivalence, the logic of scepticism, the coherence theory of truth, and nothingness.

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Fabien Schang
Université de Lorraine (PhD)

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References found in this work

On the theory of inconsistent formal systems.Newton C. A. Costa - 1972 - Recife,: Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Instituto de Matemática.
Logical Pluralism.J. C. Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.
On the theory of inconsistent formal systems.Newton C. A. da Costa - 1974 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (4):497-510.

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