Action and Agency in The Red Shoes

Film-Philosophy 22 (3):484-500 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger's ballet musical The Red Shoes is concerned with topics surrounding phenomenology, action, and embodied agency, and that it exploits resources that are uniquely cinematic in order to “do philosophy.” I argue that the film does philosophy in two ways. First, it explicates a phenomenological model of action and agency. Second, it addresses itself to the philosophical question of whether an individual's non-reflective movements – those that are not the result of deliberation or practical reasoning – are properly understood to be actions attributable to her as her own.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How does it feel to act together?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.
The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13:1 - 30.
Animals, Agency and Resistance.Bob Carter & Nickie Charles - 2013 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 43 (3):322-340.
Consideraciones epistemológicas acerca del “sentido de agencia”. Epistemological Requirements of the Sense of Agency.Fernando Broncano - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 39:7-27.
A problem for Wegner and colleagues' model of the sense of agency.Glenn Carruthers - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):341-357.
The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-26

Downloads
21 (#695,936)

6 months
2 (#1,157,335)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Paul Schofield
Bates College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.

View all 17 references / Add more references