What do we know when we learn the meaning of words?

Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 12 (2):111-123 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I will argue that, contrary to what most scholars are inclined to believe, there are important tensions between the later Wittgenstein’s views on language and Michael Tomasello’s usage-based theory of language acquisition. On one hand, Wittgenstein characterises the first steps into the acquisition of a first language as a matter of acquiring practical abilities, which, in an anti-intellectualistic vein, do not require any kind of knowledge. On the other hand, Tomasello employs a Gricean model of communication to describe pre-linguistic children’s communicative interactions, thus taking an intellectualist stance. According to this model, children are supposed to acquire the meanings of words because they are able to infer communicators’ intentions on the basis of the common ground (mutual knowledge) they establish with them. Eliciting this tension is of uttermost importance because: (i) it bears crucial implications for the explanatory relationships between language and thought; (ii) it is central to the heart of Tomasello’s project of explaining linguistic competency as based on communicative abilities. In the conclusion, I will argue that there are ways to ease the main tension if, following Richard Moore, basic communicative acts are conceived of as Minimally Gricean.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Gricean Communication and Cognitive Development.Richard Moore - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):pqw049.
Meaning and Mindreading.J. Robert Thompson - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):167-200.
Language Acquisition And Learning On Children.Fernandes Arung - 2016 - Journal of English Education 1 (1):1-9.
Wittgenstein as a Gricean Intentionalist.Elmar Geir Unnsteinsson - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):155-172.
Wittgenstein on Language, Meaning, and Use.Dan Nesher - 1992 - International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1):55-78.
Précis of how children learn the meanings of words.Paul Bloom - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1095-1103.
Social Constructivism of Language and Meaning.Chen Bo - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):87-113.
The Meaning-Sharing Network.John Haglund & Johan Blomberg - 2010 - Hortues Semioticus 6:17-30.
Meaning, Concepts, and the Lexicon.Michael Glanzberg - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):1-29.
Words are invitations to learn about categories.Sandra Waxman & William Thompson - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):88-88.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-17

Downloads
25 (#542,984)

6 months
4 (#319,344)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Antonio Scarafone
Università degli Studi di Bologna

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The seas of language.Michael Dummett - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Relevance.D. Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 2.

View all 18 references / Add more references