Abstract

I make an argument against objective moral realism which draws upon recent developments in the philosophy of science. In Chapter One, I place myself within Geoffrey Sayre-McCord's map of metaethical intellectual space, arguing for a cognitivist-objectivist interpretation of moral discourse. ;In Chapter Two, I explain why metaethics has been drawn into the philosophy of science. I argue that facts are theory-laden and that we choose between alternative conceptual frameworks based upon how well they measure up to a set of theoretical virtues . I suggest that we should apply the same criteria of theory-choice in metaethics as we do in science. ;In Chapter Three, I argue that if we compare the two major theories about the question of the ontological status of moral claims, objective moral realism and objective moral antirealism, judging them both against the criteria which most of us accept as theoretical virtues, we find that the antirealist position is superior to the realist position. Thus, if we are to retain these virtues as determining which theoretical framework we should choose, then we must admit that there are no objective moral values. Since this conclusion is in conditional form , I examine the advantages and pitfalls of such a form. ;Since I am advancing what John Mackie has called an "error theory", in Chapter Four, I address the issues of how and why we are involved in the error of objective moral realism. I bring the views of several major philosophers into the discussion in order to shed some light on the illusion of moral objectivity. ;In Chapter Five, I argue against the no-miracles argument for scientific realism in order to allow for a globally antirealist position. I make an argument for the "value-ladenness of facts" and suggest an extension of the arguments against objective moral realism to cover objective value realism in general. Finally, I point toward what I think should be the future of ethics as a discipline, suggesting a program called "naturalizing axiology"