Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:September 25, 2010 (2:45 pm) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE3001\russell 30,1 032 red corrected.wpd russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 30 (summer 2010): 69–94 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631; online 1913-8032 eviews RUSSELL VS.z MEINONG, 100 YEARS LATER Michael Scanlan South StraTord, vt 05070, usa [email protected] Nicholas GriUn and Dale Jacquette, eds. Russell vs. Meinong: the Legacy of “On Denoting”. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. Pp. xiii, 384. isbn: 978-0-415-96364-0 (hb); 978-0-203-88802-5 (e-bk). £70.00; us$103.00. The background for the conference in 2005 at McMaster University from which these papers come is a 50-year period in anglophone philosophy during which Russell was portrayed as having put to rest the urge, exempliWed by Meinong, to have an intentional object for every thought. Beginning roughly in the 1970s, analytic philosophers began publishing work more sympathetic to both the speciWcs of Meinong and his general concerns. Some landmark publications in this vein are Terence Parsons, Nonexistent Objects (1980), and Richard Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (1980). The development of more sophisticated accounts of Meinong, along with developments in Russell studies, has resulted in a more nuanced presentation of Meinong’s thought in recent literature, including this volume. There is one article in this collection which is explicitly devoted to comparing the views of the historical Russell and Meinong. This is “Psychological Content and Indeterminacy with Respect to Being” by J. C. Marek. The title indicates the two topics examined. Meinong was in the tradition of Brentano in seeing a mental state of presentation (Vorstellungz) as combining a mental act and a mental content. A presentation may or may not also have a presented object. Russell, famously, thought of the state corresponding to Meinong’s presentations as a relation called “direct acquaintance” that comes to exist, or ceases to exist, between a mind and objects. There is no place here for non-existent objects. There is very little to say about Russell’s theory of direct acquaintance and most of that is familiar to English-speaking readers, so Marek rightly devotes himself to expounding Meinong’s views on presentational content. The problem here is whether such content exists. Meinong averred he could introspect such content, and Russell averred that he could not. Beyond such fruitless personal testimony, Meinong oTered arguments for the explanatory value of presentational content. September 25, 2010 (2:45 pm) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE3001\russell 30,1 032 red corrected.wpd 70 Reviews One is as an explanation of how we could have presentations (thoughts ofy) nonexistent objects, e.g. the $1,000 in my pocket. Of course, Russell treats this with his theory of descriptions. Another such argument for mental content by Meinong is that it is needed to account for the diTerence in mental state when presented with diTerent objects. Russell says that when the mind is in relation to the distinct objects the distinctness of the objects guarantees two distinct relations of acquaintance. This leaves unclear what the mental diTerence is between seeing a red patch and seeing a blue patch. The separate discussion ofthe Meinong/Mally “indiTerence” of the “pure object ” or object itself as to whether it exists or not is a topic that is canvassed more in the anglophone literature. In Meinong’s 1904 formulation “the present king of France” doesn’t now exist, but if the French have a revolution then a “present ” king of France might exist in 2011. In either case there is an object of thought/reference, and it has (indiTerently) the character (Soseinz) of being king of France. Marek’s exposition in this area focuses on the various technical devices Meinong introduced in 1915 to mitigate the problems caused by allowing for the being of “impossible” objects such as the round square. In “Meditations on Meinong’s Golden Mountain”, Dale Jacquette oTers the traditional dramatic classroom story about Russell and OD. On this account, prior to 1905 Russell is a committed Meinongian who...