How Should We Express Moral Concern?

Journal of Human Values 11 (2):139-148 (2005)
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Abstract

In this article I discuss whether talk of ‘rights’ or talk of ‘needs’ should be used to express moral concerns. I argue that needs are the fundamental basis of morality: hence, we should only move beyond them to talk of ‘rights’ if rights can offer us a conception that cannot be included in the term ‘needs’. I then to show that all the traditional strong points of rights can be included within the term ‘needs’, that is, needs can allow us to make claims on others, and can protect us from the government; as can needs promote the individualism and self–respect usually associated with rights. Apart from adding clarity to moral debates, I argue that expressing morality in terms of needs also offers us two main advantages over rights: it discourages anthropocentrism and it assists those trying to alleviate human suffering.

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References found in this work

Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Ethics 90 (1):121-130.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Mind 88 (350):305-309.
The nature and value of rights.Joel Feinberg & Jan Narveson - 1970 - Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (4):243-260.
Taking Rights Seriously.Alan R. White - 1977 - Philosophical Quarterly 27 (109):379-380.
Human Rights t Real and Supposed.Maurice Cranston - 2002 - In Carl Wellman (ed.), Rights and Duties. Routledge. pp. 5--1.

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