On disagreement about perception

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):143 – 162 (1964)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We attempt to clarify the nature of philosophic assertions about perception by considering how one can argue effectively against such assertions. Reasons are given, with illustrative assertions from Aristotle and Berkeley, why one cannot argue effectively against such either (1) by arguing for contrary assertions in competing theories or (2) by appealing to scientific observation. Effective arguments against such accounts include (1) those which demonstrate inconsistency within the account, (2) those which disclose an unintelligibility within the account, and (3) those which show the account is inadequate in scope. These are illustrated respectively by arguments (i) against Phenomenalism, (ii) against Aristotle's account of the identity in act of sensing faculty and sensed object, and (iii) against Berkeley's account of observation through instruments.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,102

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Observation And Objectivity.Harold I. Brown - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Observation reconsidered.Jerry Fodor - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
Aristotle on perception.Stephen Everson - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Assertions in Literary Fiction.Jukka Mikkonen - 2009 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 13:144-180.
The semantics of sense perception in Berkeley.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (3):249-268.
Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Centered assertion.Stephan Torre - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):97-114.
Common sense and Berkeley's perception by suggestion.Jody Graham - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):397 – 423.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-03-05

Downloads
44 (#327,510)

6 months
1 (#1,149,473)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations