Abstract

The dissertation examines Dummett's recommendations regarding the construction of a theory of meaning. It begins by taking up the question of why a theory of meaning is wanted. It is argued that the sense in which Dummett is concerned with meaning is broad enough to give no offense to those with Quinean prejudices against "meanings". It is also argued that the sense in which Dummett is concerned to construct a theory is narrow enough to place a number of constraints on the construction of a theory of meaning. Many of these constraints may appear arbitrary at first, but can be given a rationale by leaning hard on Dummett's suggestion that an adequate theory of meaning must have a "genuinely scientific character". This rationale can be extended to provide a basis for Dummett's objections to Davidson's truth-conditional theory of meaning, namely, his objections on the grounds that the theory is modest, holistic, and faces difficulties in dealing with undecidable sentences. Unfortunately, the rationale also provides a basis for objections to Dummett's verificationist and falsificationist alternatives to Davidson's theory. Dummett's alternatives are explicitly designed to be neither modest nor holistic, but they do face difficulties when it comes to undecidable sentences. It is argued that although these difficulties are not in principle insuperable, they do suggest that Dummett's constraints on the construction of a theory of meaning may make such a theory impossible to construct