Death as a Loss

Faith and Philosophy 4 (2):149-159 (1987)
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Abstract

In this paper I describe and argue against two positions. The first, espoused by Epicurus and other philosophers, contends that in permanent death, since there is no longer a subject, my own death cannot be a loss for me. I argue that this thesis makes an illicitassumption and itself embodies a conceptual confusion. Therefore, my death can after all have the logical status of a loss for me. The Christian Church, however, has adopted what I call the “official” position; namely, that while my death could be a loss for me, if I am a believer, it must instead be considered a gain. Against this claim, I urge the adoption of a contrary “unofficial” position which argues that even as a believer my death may be a loss for me. I contend that the “official” position embodies internal incoherence and promotes a corrupt version of Christianity. The “unofficial” position, however, is compatible with Christian teaching on self-mortification and more accurately represents New Testament attitudes towards death. Thereby I conclude that regarding my death as loss to myself is neither conceptually absurd nor a failure of faith.

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