Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):155-176 (1991)

Authors
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
How should a moral realist respond to the (seemingly) abundant evidence diversity provides for relativism? Many think there is only one reasonable response: abandon moral realism. Against them, I argue that moral realists can stand their ground in the face of moral diversity without relying on excessively optimistic arguments or unrealistic assumptions. In the process, I defend two theses: (i) that, far from being incompatible with moral realism, many plausible versions of relativism are _versions of moral realism; and (ii) the best interpretation of the argument from diversity to relativism tells not at all against realist versions of relativism
Keywords Realism   Relativism   Ethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00385839
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,489
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Relativism in Context.James R. Beebe - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):691-724.
Metaethics.Geoff Sayre-McCord - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Conditions of Moral Realism.Christian Miller - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Truth in Ethical Relativism.Hugh LaFollette - 1991 - Journal of Social Philosophy 22 (1):146-154.
Debate: Requiem for Relativism in Anthropology.Derek Brereton - 2011 - Journal of Critical Realism 10 (3):358-391.
Mathematical Relativism.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1):53-65.
Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory, and Ethical Relativism.Simon Kirchin - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):413 – 427.
Do Moral Explanations Matter?Charles Sayward - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
Relativism and Our Warrant for Scientific Theories.Paul Faulkner - 2004 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):259 – 269.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
314 ( #34,164 of 2,520,856 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #405,457 of 2,520,856 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes