Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism Part II: A Further Reply to Aikin and Dabay

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This reply sets out an argument that demonstrates that a contrastive theory of self-knowledge is inconsistent with internalism in the philosophy of mind. It follows from my paper 'Contrastive Self-Knowledge', Social Epistemology, 2014, 28: 139-152.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Contrastivism and anti-individualism: a response to Aikin and Dabay.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.
Contrastive Self-knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):139-152.
Contrastive Knowledge.Adam Morton - 2013 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in philosophy. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 101-115.
A counterexample to the contrastive account of knowledge.Jason Rourke - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):637-643.
Contrastive knowledge.Antti Karjalainen & Adam Morton - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):74 – 89.
Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), The Concept of Knowledge. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 411-24.
Solving the Problem of Nearly Convergent Knowledge.Chris Tweedt - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (4):219-227.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-04-23

Downloads
14 (#934,671)

6 months
4 (#698,851)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sarah Sawyer
University of Sussex

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Contrastive Self-knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):139-152.

Add more references