Abstract

Some time ago, Quine asserted that to be is to be value of a variable. This entails that if one wishes to accept any theory as true, we must be committed to the existence of those objects over which we existentially quantify. I suggest instead that we are committed only to the existence of things for which certain intrinsic properties are contingent (those that an object can have independent of the properties that make it a member of a certain kind). Any discourse that involves existential quantification over entities for which those properties can change should be given an objectual interpretation, and these objects are therefore real. In contrast, all discourse that involves existential quantification over objects who have at least some intrinsic properties essentially, which are properties that are not what make them members of a kind, will be given a substitutional interpretation, which does not entail a realist interpretation. This conception of ontological commitment has potential direct consequences in several areas -- the status of fictional characters, the debate about the existence of god, realism about mathematical entities, and so on.