The Straw Man Fallacy as a Prestige-Gaining Device

In Sarah Bigi & Fabrizio Macagno (eds.), Argumentation and Language — Linguistic, Cognitive and Discursive Explorations. Cham: Springer Verlag (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the straw man fallacy from the perspective of pragmatic inference. Our main claim is that the straw man fallacy is a ‘pragmatic winner’ not primarily because of its persuasive power but rather because it targets the pragmatic cognitive-inferential skills of its victim while enhancing the prestige of its author. We consider that in the context of a straw man fallacy, the issue of the burden of proof, which is ‘reversed’, does not directly bear on the argumentation itself but has essentially to do with the difficulty for the targeted speaker of getting the attention of the audience back. It is difficult because countering this fallacy involves primarily a discussion of the reasons why the inference drawn was unduly derived, a process which is virtually destined to be a failure first of all because of the lack of relevance of justifications in comparison with that of actual points. Notions of retractability and the explicit-implicit divide are central to our approach.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Straw Men, Weak Men, and Hollow Men.Scott F. Aikin & John Casey - 2011 - Argumentation 25 (1):87-105.
Two Forms of the Straw Man.Robert Talisse & Scott F. Aikin - 2006 - Argumentation 20 (3):345-352.
Straw Man or Straw Theory?Louis P. Pojman - 1998 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (2):169-180.
The straw man fallacy.Douglas Walton - 1996 - In J. F. A. K. van Benthem (ed.), Logic and Argumentation. North-Holland. pp. 115--128.
Prestige Bias: An Obstacle to a Just Academic Philosophy.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-01-28

Downloads
7 (#1,356,784)

6 months
5 (#629,136)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?