Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason

Kant Yearbook 6 (1) (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In his pre-critical lectures on rational psychology, Kant employs an argument from the I to the transcendental freedom of the soul. In the (A-edition of the) first Critique, he distances himself from rational psychology, and instead offers four paralogisms of this doctrine, insisting that ‘I think’ no longer licenses any inferences about a soul. Kant also comes alive to the possibility that we could be thinking mechanisms – rational beings, but not agents. These developments rob him of his pre-critical rationalist argument for freedom. In the Groundwork, this is a serious problem; if we are not free, morality will be a phantasm for us. In Groundwork III, Kant attempts to overcome this by offering a new argument for our freedom, involving the standpoint of practical reason. In this paper, I detail these developments and present a practical and phenomenological reading of Kant’s approach in Groundwork III. I also venture a defence of this new argument.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,468

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The divorce of reason and experience: Kant's paralogisms of pure reason in context.Corey W. Dyck - 2009 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2):pp. 249-275.
Setting ends for oneself through reason.Andrews Reath - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.
Formal principles and the form of a law.Andrews Reath - 2010 - In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason.Patrick Kain - 2010 - In Benjamin Lipscomb & James Krueger (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality. de Gruyter. pp. 211--230.
On Kant's Idea of Humanity as an End in Itself.Sven Nyholm - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):358-374.
Schopenhauer and Kant.Peter Welsen - 2005 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 61 (3):757-772.
Emotions and Practical Reason in Kant.Maria Borges - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 10:161-166.
Kant's account of nature's systematicity and the unity of theoretical and practical reason.Lara Ostaric - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):155 – 178.


Added to PP

67 (#208,255)

6 months
8 (#128,520)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joe Saunders
Durham University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references