Just go ahead and lie

Analysis 72 (1):3-9 (2012)

Abstract

The view that lying is morally worse than merely misleading is a very natural one, which has had many prominent defenders. Nonetheless, here I will argue that it is misguided: holding all else fixed, acts of mere misleading are not morally preferable to acts of lying, and successful lying is not morally worse than merely deliberately misleading. In fact, except in certain very special contexts, I will suggest that – when faced with a felt need to deceive – we might as well just go ahead and lie

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2011-12-09

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Jennifer Saul
University of Waterloo

References found in this work

Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating.Jonathan E. Adler - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):435-452.
The Distinctive Wrong in Lying.Alan Strudler - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):171-179.

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Citations of this work

The Definition of Lying and Deception.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Retractions.Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3335-3359.
Lying and Misleading in Discourse.Andreas Stokke - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (1):83-134.
Liar!Jonathan Webber - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):651-659.

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