Abstract

Modularity is a familiar idea in the foundations of cognitive science, but less clear is just how modularity relates to tacit knowledge, nativism, and domain-specificity, as well as a range of other progressive programs to which it is linked. The purpose of this dissertation is to clarify the picture of cognitive architecture that has been developing since Noam Chomsky's early work and particularly since Jerry Fodor's The Modularity of Mind. The basic, received idea is that the mind is not one homogenous thing, but many component parts, interacting in various ways. ;In Chapter 1, I develop this basic account to work with information-drive computationalism, using the concept of informational isolation to define modularity. In Chapters 2 and 4, I review the recent history of modularity and its connection to nativism, considering how the arguments for one imply the other. Nativism is an independent concept, but evidence for nativism is often suggestive of modularity and vice versa. In Chapter 3, I argue that the debate in folk psychology between the theory-theory and simulation theory is confused by a more general theme, the illusory distinction between mental mechanism and psychological theory. In Chapter 5, I explore a way of sharpening the concept of domain-specificity to make it more useful to programs in cognitive science where it has been deployed.