Artificial Intelligence and Law 1 (2-3):209-235 (1992)

This article proposes a formal analysis of a fundamental aspect of legal reasoning: dealing with normative conflicts. Firstly, examples are illustrated concerning the dynamics of legal systems, the application of rules and exceptions, and the semantic indeterminacy of legal sources. Then two approaches to cope with conflicting information are presented: the preferred theories of Brewka, and the belief change functions of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. The relations between those approaches are closely examined, and some aspects of a model of reasoning with normative conflicts are outlined. Since this model takes into account an ordering of the involved regulations, criteria to order legal norms are finally specified.
Keywords non-monotonic reasoning  belief revision  rules and exceptions  normative conflicts
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DOI 10.1007/BF00114921
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Philosophy 6 (22):236-240.

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A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation.Giovanni Sartor - 1994 - Ratio Juris 7 (2):177-211.
Verification of Legal Knowledge-Base with Conflictive Concept.Shingo Hagiwara & Satoshi Tojo - 2009 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 24 (5):405-416.

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