Abstract

This article examines the application of limitation periods to civil actions for sexual assault, with particular reference to the High Court of Australia's decision in Stingel v Clark and the 'reforms' enacted pursuant to the recommendations of the Ipp Report. In Stingel v Clark, a majority of the High Court held that under the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) as it stood at the relevant time, the limitation period would only begin to run from the time the survivor of the sexual assault recognised the connection between the assault and the harm resulting from it. This article argues that the case was correctly decided both on grounds of correct statutory interpretation nd on sound public policy. It then reviews changes that have been enacted to limitation periods in Victoria and other Australian jurisdictions based on the recommendations of the Ipp Report. he article is critical of the fact that the effect of the changes in Victoria has been to erode the extension of time benefits conferred by the High Court's decision. It then examines the relevant tatutory limitations provisions throughout Australia and argues that these are inconsistent, unduly complex and inadequate in the context of civil sexual assault actions. The article concludes that the only way to ensure that a consistent and just approach is taken to the issue is to enact simple and uniform legislation throughout Australia which completely eliminates the time bar in sexual assault actions.