Abstract

The paper argues for viewing legal validityas a doxastic obligation, i.e. as the obligation toaccept a rule in legal reasoning. This notion of legalvalidity is shown to be both sufficient for thelaywers' needs and neutral in regard to varioustheories of the grounds of validity, i.e. theoriesintended to identify what rules are legally valid, byproposing different grounds for attributing validity.All of these theories, rather then being alternativedefinitions of validity, presuppose the notion hereprovided.This notion is purely normative, but it allows for theconstruction of theories of the grounds of validitywhich give due importance to social expectations andinstitutions. As an example of how this may happen,one such theory is also provided. This theory, whichis presented through a detailed example of a judicialdebate, is based upon the recognition of the(instrumental) value of co-ordination, as thenecessary way to achieve the most valuable purposes ofthe law.