Synthese 172 (3):451 - 474 (2010)

Authors
Alexander Sarch
University of Surrey
Abstract
George Bealer has provided an elaborate defense of the practice of appealing to intuition in philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that his defense fails. First, I argue that Bealer’s theory of determinate concept possession, even if true, would not establish the “autonomy” of philosophy. That is, even if he is correct about what determinate concept possession consists in, it would not follow that it is possible to answer the central questions of philosophy by critical reflection on our intuitions. Furthermore, I argue that Bealer’s account of determinate concept possession in fact faces serious problems. Accordingly, I conclude that Bealer does not succeed in vindicating the appeal to intuition in philosophy.
Keywords Intuition  Reliability of intuition  Philosophical methodology  Concepts  Concept possession  Bealer  Autonomy  Disagreement  Property identity  Semantically stable
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9402-y
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References found in this work BETA

A Theory of the a Priori.George Bealer - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:29-55.
A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Nature of Law.Andrei Marmor - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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