Abstract

In this dissertation I propose a new conception of the subject. This new conception critiques the Cartesian notion of subjectivity, which is founded on absolute certainty, while not falling prey to the overzealous attacks on the general concept of subjectivity which were largely influenced by Heidegger. In order to formulate my new conception of subjectivity I draw from David Hume, William James, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. All of them address the problems with Cartesian and Heideggerian conceptions of subjectivity. They recognize that the subject is something that is understood in and through practice, i.e. its interactions with others in the world, and that these interactions or relations are governed not by certainty, but by ambiguity. ;I present Hume as a moral and practical philosopher who stresses the importance of human sentiments and the commonality of humankind, which are important steps on the way to constituting the subject inter-subjectively. I depict James' pragmatism as a segue between, and complimentary to, Hume's empiricism and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. I examine James' pragmatism and describe how it informs his conception of subjectivity. I then explain the progression of Merleau-Ponty's conception of the subject and draw upon his concept of intertwining to understand the subject as a type of movement, that is both transcendent and immanent. ;Finally, I bring together the various elements of the different thinkers that I have chosen to focus on in order to demonstrate how they all share a common bond, and using this as a basis, I describe my conception of the practical-ambiguous subject. It is a conception of subjectivity that rejects the notion of absolute certain foundations and instead emphasizes the relationship between oneself and others in the world, and understands those relationships as practical and ambiguous