The direction of causation and the direction of conditionship

Journal of Philosophy 73 (8):193-207 (1976)
  Copy   BIBTEX


I criticize and emend J L Mackie's account of causal priority by replacing ‘fixity’ in its central clause by 'x is a causal condition of y, but y is not a causal condition of x'. This replacement works only if 'is a causal condition of' is not a symmetric relation. Even apart from our desire to account for causal priority, it is desirable to have an account of nonsymmetric conditionship. Truth, for example, is a condition of knowledge, but knowledge is not a condition of truth. My definitions of 'sufficient condition for' and 'necessary condition for' do not imply that p is a sufficient condition of q if and only if q is a necessary condition of p.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Causes, Counterfactuals, and Non-Locality.Mathias Frisch - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):655-672.
Modularity and the causal Markov condition: A restatement.Daniel M. Hausman & James Woodward - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):147-161.
Independence, invariance and the causal Markov condition.Daniel M. Hausman & James Woodward - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):521-583.
The Logical Paradox of Causation.Yuval Steinitz - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:223-227.
Causal Dependence and Multiplicity.David H. Sanford - 1985 - Philosophy 60 (232):215-230.


Added to PP

253 (#82,585)

6 months
19 (#145,073)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Sanford
Duke University

Citations of this work

Supervenience as a philosophical concept.Jaegwon Kim - 1990 - Metaphilosophy 21 (1-2):1-27.
Regularity theories reassessed.Michael Baumgartner - 2006 - Philosophia 36 (3):327-354.
Causal necessity and logical necessity.David H. Sanford - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (2):185 - 194.
How to Make Things Have Happened.Graham Nerlich - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):1 - 22.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references