Authors
Alexander Sandgren
Australian National University
Abstract
The problem of the many seems to problematize the platitude that we can think about particular things in the world. How is it that, given how very many cat-like candidates there are, we often manage to think and talk about a particular cat? I argue that this challenge stems from an under-examined assumption about the relationship between metaphysics and intentionality. I explore and develop a way of characterizing what it is to think and talk about the world, according to which an abundant ontology poses no obstacle to our ability to think and talk about particular things.
Keywords The Problem of the Many  Aboutness  Plenitude  Intentional Objects  Intentionality
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Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Princeton University Press.

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