Self-Knowledge and Epistemic Virtues: between Reliabilism and Responsibilism

Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):579-593 (2015)
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Abstract

This paper is about the role of self-knowledge in the cognitive life of a virtuous knower. The main idea is that it is hard to know ourselves because introspection is an unreliable epistemic source, and reason can be a source of insidious forms of self-deception. Nevertheless, our epistemic situation is such that an epistemically responsible agent must be constantly looking for a better understanding of her own character traits and beliefs, under the risk of jeopardizing her own status as a knower, ruining her own intellectual life.

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