O Significado da Negação

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73 (3-4):1137-1152 (2017)
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Abstract

Unilateralism and bilateralism are theories of meaning that try to explain meaning in terms of use. They provide different accounts of the meaning of logical constants. Traditionally, unilateralism has been associated with intuitionistic logic. Bilateralism has been used to provide a new understanding of classical logic. I discuss three objections to bilateralism. I argue that, if meaning needs to be explained in terms of use, unilateralism provides a better account of the meaning of logical constants.

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Gonçalo Santos
Universidade de Lisboa

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