Abstract
The purpose of this book is to construct a naturalistic theory of meaning. Millikan starts with two suppositions. First, like the devices of many other biological systems, "we suppose that normally a natural-language device has continued to be proliferated only because it has served a describable, stable function or set of functions." Second, like the operative features of many other biological devices, "speaker utterances of a language device presumably are proliferated only in so far as stable overt or covert reactions by cooperating partners... are also proliferated." From these naturalistic suppositions the notion of proper function is derived, refined, and applied to language devices. This provides a basis for a naturalistic explanation of intentionality as well as for the development of what Millikan calls "Fregean" sense, which she sharply distinguishes from intensionality. For Millikan we may have different "iterated programs" for recognizing for example, gold, but share the publicly construed sense of gold. Millikan then applies her theory of meaning to a number of problems in the philosophy of language including the references of indexicals, descriptions, and negations. Millikan provides further support for her theory of meaning by constructing a compatible theory of identity and a compatible epistemology.