Locke, Leibniz, and Wiggins on being in the same place at the same time

Philosophical Review 79 (1):75-82 (1970)
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Abstract

Locke thought it was a necessary truth that no two material bodies could be in the same place at the same time. Leibniz wasn't so sure. This paper sides with Leibniz. I examine the arguments of David Wiggins in defense of Locke on this point (Philosophical Review, January 1968). Wiggins’ arguments are ineffective.

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David Sanford
Duke University

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