Distinctness and non-identity

Analysis 65 (4):269–274 (2005)
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The following statement (A) is usually abbreviated with symbols: (A) There are items X and Y, each is F, X is not identical to Y, and everything F is identical to X or is identical to Y. (A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of exactly two distinct things that are F. Some things are neither identical nor distinct. The difference between distinctness and nonidentity makes a difference in asking questions about counting, constitution, and persistence.



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David Sanford
Duke University

Citations of this work

Does the exclusion argument put any pressure on dualism.Daniel Stoljar & Christian List - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):96-108.
Does the Exclusion Argument Put Any Pressure on Dualism?Christian List & Daniel Stoljar - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):96-108.
Object-Dependence.Avram Hiller - 2013 - Essays in Philosophy 14 (1):33-55.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
The Problem of the Many.Peter Unger - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):411-468.
Constitution is not identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):89-106.

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