A Frege‐Geach Style Objection to Cognitivist Judgment Internalism

Dialectica 68 (3):391-408 (2014)
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Abstract

According to judgment internalism, there is a conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation. This paper offers an argument against that kind of internalism that does not involve counterexamples of the amoralist sort. Instead, it is argued that these forms of judgment internalism fall prey to a Frege-Geach type argument

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Thorsten Sander
University of Duisburg-Essen

Citations of this work

A New Indifference Argument against Motivational Internalism.Zhang Wan - 2017 - 4th BEIJING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE.

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